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SOME OBSERVATIONS CONCERNING
ARTICLE 3 OF THE UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE
William D. Hawkland*
The now common tendency to characterize article III of the
Uniform Commercial Code as a conservative statute which does
little more than resolve the conflicts of authority which had de-
veloped under the NIL probably can be traced to Dean Frederick
K. Beutel. Criticizing article III in 1951, Dean Beutel stated
that:
"The first outstanding change [made by article III]
which strikes the eye of one intimately acquainted with the
subject is that the draftsmen of the present Code have at-
tempted to codify the holdings of the courts and to settle
most of the numerous judicial conflicts which have appeared
under seventy sections of the N.I.L .... There seems to have
been an attempt in these changes to follow the weight of
judicial authority rather than any consistent theory."'
Proponents of article III found it useful not to attack this
statement, but, on the contrary, to use it to rebut the assertion
that the article effected a general overhaul of the law of com-
mercial paper. Thus, for example, when the Chase Bank opposed
article III in the hearings conducted by the New York Law
Revision Commission on the ground that the new statute com-
pletely revised the NIL and its enactment, therefore, "would
result in a discarding of nearly all case law and experience built
up over a period of fifty years," a spokesman for the Code, Pro-
fessor Arthur E. Sutherland, responded by quoting the remarks
of Dean Beutel set out above. Thus posited, Professor Suther-
land concluded that:
"Certainly it was not the intention of the lawyers who
participated in drafting the Code, including men from all
over the United States whose practice had led them into all
fields of commerce, to produce a revolution in the law of
negotiable instruments. Rather it was to bring the statutory
law up to date, in the light of contemporary practices, and
*Dean, State University of New York School of Law.
1. Bkeutel, Comparison of the Proposed Commercial Code, Article 8, and the
Negostable Instruments Law, 30 NEi. L. REv. 531-32 (1951).
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the judicial decisions in the half-century and more since the
negotiable instruments law was drafted."'2
It was probably this kind of process, engaged in by different
people at different places and times, which created the impres-
sion that article III is basically nothing more than a mere
declaration of the best negotiable instruments law which has
developed in the United States over the past one hundred years. 8
Whatever its genesis, this description is too modest. Article III
makes at least three major contributions to the law of commer-
cial paper: (1) it limits its own scope to short-term money
instruments, thus freeing long-term investment paper for the
separate coverage of special rules provided by article VIII; (2)
it coordinates its rules with the law of bank deposits and col-
lections, set out in article IV, thus facilitating the banking
system; and (3) it makes certain basic and sometimes novel
changes in the law of commercial paper, thus providing demon-
strably better solutions to problems, some of which are age-old.
I. SCOPE LIMITED TO COMMERCIAL PAPER
Bonds came into general use in the United States prior to
the Civil War as a method of raising the enormous amounts
of capital needed to build the nation's railroads and canals. 4
Investors undoubtedly 5 regarded these instruments as negotiable
in the sense of feeling that a bona fide purchaser for value and
without notice should take the paper free and clear of defenses
of the issuer and remote parties and also free of claims or
equities of prior ownership. Some courts honored this expecta-
tion and held bonds negotiable without showing undue concern
for the language employed in the instruments.6 Other courts,
however, regarded bonds as "mere bills or notes" and held that
their negotiability depended upon their ability to satisfy the
2. 1 NEw YORK LAW REVISION COMMISSION REPORT 52 (1954).
3. Id. at 241.
4. See, generally, POOR, HISTORY OF RAILROADS AND CANALS (1860), cited in
STEFFEN, CASES ON COMMERCIAL AND INVESTMENT PAPER 198 (3d ed. 1964).
5. There is an inveterate tendency on the part of investors to regard securities
as negotiable, even in the face of judicial hostility. As Carlos L. Israels has stated,
"Perhaps no assumption is more generally made in our free securities markets than
that all instruments which would be within the catchall phrase 'commonly known
as a security' are technically 'negotiable instruments' as that term is used in
the Uniform Neogtiable Instruments Law." Israels, Investment Securities as
Negotiable Paper, 13 Bus. LAW. 676 (1958).
6. See, for example, The Junction R.R. v. Cleneay, 13 Ind. 161 (1859);
Carr v. Le Fevre, 27 Pa. St. 413 (1856); American Nat'l Bank v. American
Wood Paper Co., 19 R.I. 149, 32 AtI. 305 (1895) ; see, generally, STEFFEN, CASES
ON COMMERCIAL AND INVESTMENT PAPER 198 (3d ed. 1964).
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formal requisites of negotiability laid down by the common law
for these short-term money instruments.
7
Thus, when the NIL was promulgated near the turn of the
century, there was a sharp division among common law juris-
dictions as to the standard by which the negotiability of bonds
was to be tested.
Since security specialists were doubtless aware of this state
of affairs and knew how important it was to have the nego-
tiability of bonds and other investment securities tested by
standards somewhat more relaxed than those applicable to
promissory notes, checks and drafts, it is nothing short of
astonishing to find no record of any efforts made by this group
to get securities excluded from the coverage of the NIL. Ap-
parently they assumed that the courts would surely treat securi-
ties as sui generis instruments falling completely outside the
scope of the statute. This assumption may have been predicated
on the fact that the NIL did not specifically cover securities and,
in section 196, stated that the law merchant should govern cases
not provided for by the act. Whatever its basis, the assumption
proved to be incorrect in many states and decisions were handed
down that securities were negotiable or non-negotiable depend-
ing on their ability to satisfy the formal requisites of nego-
tiability set out in the NIL.8 In the most celebrated of these
decisions, President & Directors of Manhattan Co. v. Morgan,9
Justice Cardozo admitted, at least impliedly, that interim cer-
tificates were regarded as negotiable by those dealing on the
securities market. But, he said, this custom of the trade- the
law merchant - could not make these certificates negotiable in
the face of specific prohibitions found in the NIL.
"The law merchant cannot prevail against prohibitions
so specific. In holding otherwise, we should do more than
supplement the statute. We should disregard and contradict
it. The plaintiff's case is not helped by section [196 of the
NIL] ... to the effect that, 'in any case not provided for in
7. See, for example, Ide v. Passumpsic and Connecticut Rivers R.R., 32 Vt.
297 (1859) ("bonds . . . are in fact . . . mere bills or notes, and as strictly
negotiable as bank bills.") ; Parsons v. Jackson, 99 U.S. 434 (1878).
8. See, for example, President and Directors of Manhattan Co. v. Morgan,
242 N.Y. 38, 150 N.E. 594 (1926) ; Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Maryland v. An-
drews, 244 Mich. 159, 221 N.W. 114 (1928) ; Kohn v. Sacramento Electric,
Gas & Ry. Co., 168 Cal. 1, 141 Pac. 626 (1914); King Cattle Co. v. Joseph,
158 Minn. 481, 198 N.W. 798, 199 N.W. 437 (1924).
9. See cases cited note 8 supra.
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this chapter the rules of the law merchant shall govern.'
The difficulty is that the case is provided for. Unforeseen
situations may reveal gaps in the statutory rules. In such
circumstances the law merchant is competent to fill them.
It is without power to annul what the statute has ordained."'1
Obviously these decisions holding investment securities to
be within the scope of the NIL did great harm to the securities
market, because they overlooked the functional differences be-
tween investment paper and commercial paper. Thus, though
bonds and promissory notes are formally similar, the former
usually involve long-term investments, purchased after- careful
consideration, and not frequently transferred, by investors rely-
ing heavily on group action in the case of default. These instru-
ments are frequently several hundred, or even thousand, words
in length and are complicated by security, redemption, tax, sink-
ing-fund, registration and other clauses. Notes, on the other
hand, are "couriers without luggage"" designed to generate
short-term financing on a low discount basis. Low discounting
depends on keeping the financer's risks and administrative costs
at a minimum, and this, in turn, requires that negotiable, com-
mercial-paper, instruments assume a form which will allow the
discounter to determine at a glance - surely without elaborate
investigation - their present value. Consequently, it is the gen-
eral rule that the negotiability of a promissory note is defeated
by a clause which makes its promise subject to the terms of an
extrinsic document, not necessarily because the extrinsic agree-
ment may contain terms and conditions which are offensive to
negotiability - though this is usually the case - but because
the necessity of having to scrutinize the incorporated agreement
increases the cost of adminstering short-term paper to such an
extent that it makes low discounting impossible. In short, a
long-term investor will routinely study indentures and the like
which are incorporated by reference into bonds, and therefore a
"subject to" clause does not militate against investment securi-
ties performing the functions for which they were created;
short-term financers, on the other hand, cannot afford to check
out extrinsic matters, and therefore a "subject to" clause in a
10. President and Directors of Manhattan Co. v. Morgan, 242 N.Y. 38, 49-50,
150 N.E. 594, 597-98 (1926).
11. See, Overton v. Tyler, 3 Pa. 346 (1846) in which Chief Justice Gibson
announced his famous dictum 'that a negotiable instrument "is a courier without
luggage."
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promissory note militates against the low-discounting function
for which it was created.
As a result of these considerations, a sharp reaction set in
against the decisions holding that the NIL rules also pertained
to investment securities. This reaction apparently induced some
courts to change their minds. In New York, for example, the
case of Enoch v. Brandon,1 2 decided only two years after Presi-
dent & Directors of Manhattan Co. v. Morgan, held a bond
negotiable in spite of the fact that its payment was made "sub-
ject to" the terms of a trust indenture. This decision, though
meeting some critical approval,13 actually resulted in a great dis-
service to the commercial world, and particularly the world of
commercial paper, because it was based not on the proposition
that the NIL does not, or should not, apply to bonds, but that
the NIL permitted paper containing "subject to" language to
be negotiable. How this decision led the Louisiana court, for
example, into a serious error with respect to promissory notes
is explained by Dean Beutel in a brilliant article 14 in which he
states that:
"[The 'same sentence' doctrine] 15 rose to plague the court
in Newman v. Schwarz." ... But it is obvious that the 'same
sentence' doctrine, even if it were sound, could apply only
12. 249 N.Y. 263, 164 N.E. 45 (1928).
13. See, for example, Note, 29 COLUm. L. Rav. 365 (1929).
14. Beutel, Common Law of Judicial Technique and the Laws of Negotiable In-
struments- Two Unfortunate Decisions, 9 TuL. L. REV. 64, 73-76 (1934).
15. Most courts agree with the statement made in Powell & Powell v. Green-
leaf & Currier, 104 Vt. 480, 482-83, 162 Atl. 377, 378 (1932) : "Where the promise
to pay is made 'subject to' some other contract referred to, the authorities seem
to be agreed that the obligation is conditional and negotiability is destroyed ...
On the other hand, the words 'as per terms of contract,' . . . in a promissory
note ... [is] held not to affect its negotiability. For a collection of cases, see
HAWKLAND, CASES ON BILLS AND NoTES 18-19 (1956). But Louisiana never
adopted the approach of arbitrarily finding that "subject to" promises are condi-
tional and "as per" promises are not. Rather, its courts emphasize -the position
of the promissory language with respect to the words which refer to the extrinsic
matter. If the qualifying language appears in the same sentence as the promissory
words, the Louisiana courts usually have held the promise to be conditional. See,
for example, Continental Bank & Trust Co. v. Times Publishing Co., 142 La. 209,
76 So. 612 (1917). On the other hand, if the qualifying language appears in a
different sentence from the words of promise, they tend to find the promise un-
conditional. See, for example, Tyler v. Whitney-Central Trust & Say. Bank,
157 La. 249, 102 So. 325 (1924): This construction technique is what Dean
Beutel calls "the same sentence doctrine."
16. 180 La. 153, 156 So. 206 (1934). In this case the statement, "Rent note.
Subject to terms of lease Dated May 2, 1927" was written in red ink across the
face of a promissory note. The court held that the promise was unconditional
because the "subject to" statement did not relate to the unconditional promise of
the maker and amounted to nothing more than a statement of the transaction
which gave rise to the note.
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where the words alleged to limit the promise were ambiguous.
Even the cleverest counsel could not convince the most stupid
of courts that words which clearly made the promise in the
instrument dependent or conditioned upon some outside docu-
ment would not destroy negotiability merely because they
appeared in a separate sentence.
"When the 'same sentence' doctrine was established in the
mind of the Louisiana Supreme Court in considering the
facts of Newman v. Schwarz there still remained the hercu-
lean task of proving that the term 'subject to contract' was
ambiguous.... Although there is not a word of this in the
opinion, the record discloses that this point was hotly argued
in the briefs, and herein lies the nub of the story of how a
court can go entirely wrong by applying approved common
law judicial technique to the interpretation of a statute.
"Up until 1928 all authorities agreed that the words 'sub-
ject to contract' no matter where they appeared in an other-
wise negotiable instrument rendered it non-negotiable ...
At this time there appeared in the Court of Appeals of New
York the interesting and much discussed case of Enoch v.
Brandon, which has mothered a whole litter of weasel cases
sucking the life out of the N.I.L.
"[Because of this case] the Supreme Court of Louisiana,
without a single dissenting vote, fell into the trap, rendering
a decision [Newman v. Schwarz] which is not only contrary
to the weight of authority under the N.I.L. but also con-
trary to the common sense dictionary meaning of the words
of the note and of the statute."
Thus it became apparent, at least to critical observers, that
the inclusion of investment securities within the scope of the
NIL not only did serious damage to the securities market but
was injurious to operations involving commercial paper as well.
In some states this mischief was partially mitigated by the en-
actment of piecemeal legislation, the most popular model of
which was the Hofstadter Securities Receipts Act of New York,17
But it was clear from. the start that fragmentary legislation
was not the answer to this tough problem, and that only a com-
prehensive statute completely divorced from the law of commer-
17. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1926, c. 704.
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cial paper and setting out detailed rules for investment securities
could do the job.'
Therefore, article III makes a major contribution to commer-
cial law by excluding from its scope the subject of investment
securities. This exclusion is accomplished by section 3-103(1)
which provides that:
"This Article does not apply to money, documents of title or
investment securities."
This restriction on its own coverage made by article III
paved the way for article VIII which sets out detailed rules
governing investment securities. To free the investor from the
possibility that a particular security might be drawn in such a
way as to satisfy the formal requisites of negotiability of article
III as well as article VIII and thus put in doubt the applicable
law, section 8-102(1) (b) states that in this case the law of
article VIII shall govern.
Through these provisions of subordination and coordination
the securities market is free for the first time in American his-
tory from the threat of having the negotiability of its instru-
ments judged by a law having no functional relationship to it,
and judges now know that they can rigorously apply the formal
requisites of negotiability to notes, checks, and drafts without
the possibility of injuring investment securities.
II. COORDINATION EFFECTED WITH ARTICLE IV
Banks in the United States handle about fifty million checks
a day. Large numbers of checks also were being collected by
the banking system at the turn of the century, but the collection
process had not then achieved, nor did it need, the speed and
efficiency of today's operation. According to an Oregon case'19
as late as 1919 it was considered normal banking practice for
the president of a bank to extract from the morning mail all the
items sent for collection, to foot these checks up on an adding
machine to ascertain that each total corresponded with the cash
18. See, Llewellyn, Brief Statement for the Proponents: Article III, in New
YORK LAw REv. COMM. Doe. No. 65(c) - 1954 - 8593, p. 2 :"Patchwork amend-
ment could never produce an Article VIII. Only a Code could thus accommodate
and give the needed detailed guidance to this burstive flood of transactions and
instruments undreamed of when the Negotiable Instruments Law was formed by
good and careful men in 1897."
19. Hunt v. Security State Bank, 91 Ore. 362, 179 Pac. 248 (1919).
[Vol. XXVI
SOME OBSERVATIONS
letter, to examine each check to see that the signatures were
genuine and that there were no irregularities, and finally to
inspect the state of the drawer's account to determine whether
there was a sufficient and free balance to make payment. It
was during these halcyon days that the NIL was enacted, and it
is not surprising to note that its draftsmen assumed that the
banking system could operate smoothly on the basis of its gen-
eral rules of commercial paper. Consequently, the new statute
contained few provisions directly relative to bank collections.
Perhaps special bank collection rules were not needed at this
time, but as the nation developed into an industrial and com-
mercial giant, the banking system was forced to overhaul its
collection process with an aim toward developing greater speed
and efficiency. This overhaul necessitated the enactment of a
comprehensive bank collection law which would operate uni-
formly throughout the country. Uniformity was important be-
cause many items in the process of bank collection often cross
state lines and comprehensiveness was indicated by the com-
plexity which the process had assumed. In response to these
needs, the American Bankers Association drafted a Bank Collec-
tion Code, but this "Code" was rejected in a number of states
and thus never attained uniformity, and it was too incomplete
to provide the comprehensive coverage that was needed. As a
result, even in states in which the Bank Collection Code had
been enacted, the NIL and the common law were frequently
called upon to supplement its provisions. Of course, the tech-
nique of drafting a statute in such a way that it will be supple-
mented by another related statute is a wholly acceptable one, if
the general and the supplementary laws are carefully coordi-
nated. But no such coordination was effected by the Bank Col-
lection Code, and this is just one of the reasons that its drafts-
manship was characterized by one legal scholar as "fifth rate."-'
Though this criticism may be too strong, it is clear that the
Bank Collection Code did not prevent the courts from making
applicable to the collection process certain NIL rules that were
completely at odds with banking practices which had streamlined
the machinery employed in the collection of checks. For example,
the bank collection process cannot run smoothly and speedily if
collecting banks must investigate all indorsements to determine
whether or not restrictions or conditions have been imposed. But
in 1938 the New York Court of Appeals, because of provisions
S20. Townsend, The Bank Collection Code of the American Bankers Aasocia-
tion, 8 TUL. L. REV. 21, 236, 376 (1933).
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of the Bank Collection Code and the NIL, held that a "for de-
posit" indorsement was restrictive and protected the indorser
against all parties, including collecting banks, into whose hands
the check might come.21 The case involved an action against
the Federal Reserve Bank for converting a check. The plaintiff,
an illiterate woman, received the check late Friday upon the
sale of real estate. She was persuaded by Handrulis to let him
keep the check for her. She indorsed it "for deposit" and en-
trusted it to him. Subsequently, it was indorsed by one Alkoff
and deposited in her account at Globe Bank. Globe then collected
the check through the Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
After the item was collected, Handrulis and probably Alkoff
absconded with the proceeds. Plaintiff was allowed to prevail
against an intermediate collecting bank on the theory that "the
indorsement 'for deposit' gave notice of its restrictive and non-
negotiable character generally and of plaintiff's continued title
to all parties into whose hands the check might come."
To hold an intermediate collecting bank to the terms of a
restrictive indorsement placed on an instrument by some remote
party might have been fair in the simpler days of the past, but
it was an unfair and unworkable rule for the highly complex
state in which banking found itself in the year 1938. As Pro-
fessor Llewellyn was to say later, the restrictive indorsement
proved to be a monkey-wrench thrown into the smooth-running
machinery of bank collections. 22
In correcting the matter of restrictive indorsements and
similar impediments to good banking, the draftsmen of the UCC
elected to follow the device of having specific banking rules
supplemented by the general law of commercial paper, presum-
ably on the ground that this approach avoids a great deal of
duplication. Article IV sets out in fairly comprehensive detail
a series of rules governing bank deposits and collections. Article
III supplements these rules. The two articles are coordinated
and their rules reflect a policy of implementing the efficient
and speedy handling of checks. For example, the restrictive
indorsement problem discussed above is solved by a provision
in article III which is incorporated by reference into article IV.
Section 3-206 (2) provides that:
21. Soma v. Handrulis, 277 N.Y. 223, 14 N.E. 2d 146 (1938).
22. Llewellyn in 1 NEW YORK LAW REVISION CoMMISSIoN REPORT 194(1954).
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"An intermediary bank, or a payor bank which is not the
depositary bank, is neither given notice nor otherwise af-
fected by a restrictive indorsement of any person except the
bank's immediate transferor or the person presenting for
payment."
This section is incorporated into section 4-203, a provision
announcing a general "chain of command" theory to the effect
that only the instructions given by the immediate transferor-
as contrasted with remote, earlier parties - are binding on col-
lecting banks.
Through this kind of approach, article III does a great
service to the banking industry by coordinating its rules with
those of article IV and by providing solutions to modern bank
collection problems.
III. SOME SPECIFIC CHANGES IN THE BASIC LAW
OF COMMERCIAL PAPER
Article III makes a number of changes in the law of com-
mercial paper as it developed under the NIL. Only a few of
these changes can be discussed here, but they should be suf-
ficient to reveal the approach of the article and its thrust toward
improving the law of commercial paper.
A. Formal Requisites of Negotiability
Section 3-104 provides that an instrument to be negotiable
"within this article" must be signed by the maker or drawer,
and contain an unconditional promise to pay a sum certain in
money on demand or at a definite time, to order or to bearer.
These formal requisites are substantially identical to those found
in section 1 of the NIL. Subsequent sections of the UCC, how-
ever, elaborate the provisions of section 3-104 in such a way as
to make some basic alterations in the old law.
One interesting elaboration is found in section 3-105 which
outlines the conditional or unconditional character of promises
or orders for purposes of negotiability. This section follows
the old rule that a promise or order is not unconditional if the in-
strument states that it is to be paid only out of a particular fund
or source,23 but it makes an exception in two situations which
23. NIL § 3-105(2) (b).
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have been bothersome in the past. The first exception relates
to paper issued by a government or governmental agency.
24
Governmental units in many states are authorized to execute
short-term paper, as well as long-term bonds, to raise capital
for public improvements. Frequently, the authorizing statute
requires that the paper so issued must be redeemed by funds
raised from special assessments of the property benefited by
the public improvement and, in this case, the borrowing instru-
ment usually states that its payment is limited to this particular
fund. Under traditional notions of commercial paper, such a
statement destroys negotiability because the existence of the
fund is a condition precedent to the promisor's duty to pay.
25
Nevertheless, lenders and investors have shown a willingness to
accept governmental paper so conditioned, and the draftsmen
of the UCC saw no merit in denying them the protection of the
concept of negotiability. This protection is needed primarily
where the instrument has been stolen, because it will enable a
holder in due course to take free and clear of the ownership
claim. 26 Presumably, the holder in due course will take subject
to the possibility that the particular fund will not come into
existence or be adequate to make full payment, because this con-
dition is stated in the paper itself. The Code, therefore, seems
to draw a distinction, once briefly made by the Washington
courts, 27 between negotiability of government paper for pur-
poses of -cutting off ownership claims but not for purposes of
taking free of conditions and contract defenses.
24. Section 3-105(1) (g) provides that "A promise or order otherwise uncon-
ditional is not made conditional by the fact that the instrument is limited to pay-
ment out of a particular fund or the proceeds of a particular source, if the
instrument is issued by a government or governmental agency or unit."
25. See, for example, Bank of California v. National City Co., 141 Wash. 243,
251 Pac. 561 (1926).
26. See §3-305(1).
27. In Manker v. American Sav. Bank & Trust Co., 131 Wash. 430, 230 Pac.
406 (1924) bonds payable only from funds raised through special assessments
were held non-negotiable. But Parker, J., dissented: "The local improvement
bond here drawn in question is by its express terms, payable to bearer, as are
manifestly all of the other bonds of the series to which it belongs. These bonds
manifestly were issued for the express purpose of being transferred in the open
market by mere delivery. They may not be negotiable in that large and compre-
hensive sense which precludes the invoking against them of every possible defense
which the city or the owners of the property which the burden might invoke, but,
to my mind, they are pure negotiable instruments in the sense that their title
passes from holders thereof to purchasers in good faith by mere transfer of posses-
sion." (Emphasis added.) 230 Pac. at 409. A subsequent case, Bank of California
v. National City Co., 138 Wash. 517, 244 Pac. 690 (1926) adopted the view of the
dissent in the Manker case. On rehearing, however, the court reversed itself and
said that there are not two standards of negotiability, that an instrument is nego-
tiable for all purposes or non-negotiable for all purposes..
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A second exception to the "particular fund" doctrine is in-
tended by UCC section 3-105 (1) (h). This section provides that:
"A promise or order otherwise unconditional is not made
conditional by the fact that the instrument is limited to pay-
ment out of the entire assets of a partnership, unincorporated
association, trust or estate by or on behalf of which the in-
strument is issued."
This section is directed toward the practice of some unin-
corporated associations which desire to limit the payment of
promissory notes to the assets of the association, qua associa-
tion, by expressly excluding the liability of the individual mem-
bers of the firm. While such instruments are supported as gen-
erally as the negotiable instruments issued by corporations,
which, of course, carry only the credit of the corporate entity
since shareholders normally have no personal liability for cor-
porate debts, technically they are payable only out of a par-
ticular fund, because the general credit of the association, which
includes the personal responsibility of its members, is not made
available for payment. As a result, some courts have held these
instruments non-negotiable. 28 Other courts, however, deserting
pure logic in the interest of practicality, have held that such
paper may be negotiable.2 9 There is no doubt that the draftsmen
of the UCC intended to adopt this latter approach, for official
comment 7 to section 3-105 states that:
"Paragraph (h) of subsection (1) is new. It adopts the
policy of decisions holding that an instrument issued by an
unincorporated association is negotiable although its payment
is expressly limited to the assets of the association, excluding
the liability of individual members. .. ."
Unfortunately, however, the language of section 3-105 (1) (h)
does not clearly state a rule consistent with this policy, because
it provides that the instrument of the unincorporated associa-
tion may be negotiable when it "is limited to payment out of
the entire assets of the partnership, unincorporated association
• . . by or on behalf of which the instrument is issued." (Em-
phasis added.) The "entire assets" of a partnership or an
28. See, for example, Lorimer v. McGreevy, 229 Mo. App. 970, 84 S.W.2d 667
(1935), discussed in Notes, 49 HARV. L. REV. 478 (1936), 34 MICH. L. REV.
1030 (1936), 45 YALE L.J. 176 (1935).
29. See the leading case of Hibbs v. Brown, 190 N.Y. 167, 82 N.E. 1108
(1907).
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unincorporated association include the personal liability of its
members, and paper issued by such business organizations which
exempts this liability is not backed by its entire assets. But
the words "entire assets" should not be given their plain mean-
ing in view of the fact that the word "limited" in the phrase
"limited to payment out of the entire assets" would be rendered
meaningless by such a construction and by the fact that the
draftsmen have made their purposes clear in the official com-
ment to the section. Fairly construed, section 3-105 (1) (h) gives
members of unincorporated associations the advantages of share-
holders of corporations in this limited situation.
A major improvement in elaborating the formal requisites
of negotiability is found in section 3-109 (1) (c) which provides,
in effect, that the certainty of time payment is not affected by
"any acceleration" clause, whether the accelerating event is
automatic or at the option of either the holder or the obligor.
Under the NIL acceleration clauses were sometimes held to
militate against negotiability on the ground that they rendered
the time of payment uncertain. For example, instruments pay-
able at a fixed date or sooner "on demand of the holder if he
deems himself insecure" were consistently struck down as non-
negotiable.30 Actually, of course, an instrument containing such
a clause or, indeed, any acceleration clause is no more uncertain
as to its time of payment than a demand instrument which was
explicitly permitted to be negotiable under the NIL. But the
courts have recognized that deeming-himself-insecure accelera-
tion clauses are not to be treated as the equivalent of promises
to pay on demand, because the former, unlike the latter, imply
some limitations on the right to call the instrument. Judicial
hostility toward acceleration clauses, and particularly those
which apparently give the holder an unlimited freedom to de-
clare the instrument due, seems to reflect misgivings regard-
ing the abuse of discretion to accelerate and difficulties in de-
termining the limits on that discretion, rather than concern over
the time of payment. In short, the courts, unwilling to treat
broad acceleration clauses as making the instrument payable on
demand because of implied limitations on the right to declare
30. See, for example, Murrell v. Exchange Bank, 168 Ark. 645, 271 S.W. 21
(1925) ; Moyer v. Hyde, 35 Idaho 161, 204 Pac. 1068 (1922); Puget Sound
State Bank v. Washington Paving Co., 94 Wash. 504, 162 Pac. 870 (1917) ; contra,
Dart Nat'l Bank v. Burton, 258 Mich. 283, 241 N.W. 858 (1932).
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the paper due, have held the instrument non-negotiable where
they have been unable to determine the scope of the limitations.
The UCC changes this approach. Section 3-109(1) (c)
broadly validates all acceleration clauses, but section 1-20831
provides safeguards against abuse and sets forth the limitations
on the power to accelerate where wide acceleration language
has been used. This approach makes it clear that the draftsmen
of the UCC regard the matter of acceleration as one of good
faith rather than as one of negotiability.
The broad validation of acceleration clauses by section 3-
109(1) (c) probably will nullify one of the purposes of section
3-109(2). Section 3-109(2) attempts to change section 4(3) of
the NIL which provided that an instrument is payable at a
definite time for purposes of negotiability, if it is payable "on
or at a fixed period after the occurrence of a specified event,
which is certain to happen, though the time of happening is
uncertain." This rule was formulated as a concession to in-
dividuals desiring to borrow on their inheritance by use of post-
obituary notes (e.g., "I promise to pay six weeks after my Uncle
George's death") .32 Post-obituary notes are neither mathemati-
cally nor commercially certain as to time of maturity, and there
may be good reasons to preserve the defenses of parties who
execute them. Because of these reasons, section 3-109(2) at-
tempts to make post-obituary notes non-negotiable by providing
that:
"An instrument which by its terms is otherwise payable
only upon an act or event uncertain as to time of occurrence
is not payable at a definite time even though the act or event
has occurred."
This provision will effectively police post-obituary notes as
now commonly drawn by making them non-negotiable. But a
negotiable post-obituary note can be drafted under the Code by
using an acceleration clause. A note, "I promise to pay six
weeks after my Uncle George's death," would fail of negotia-
31. Section 1-208 provides that: "A term providing that one party or his
successor in interest may accelerate payment or performance or require collateral
or additional collateral 'at will' or 'when he deems himself insecure' or in words
of similar import shall be construed to mean that he shall have power to do so
only if he in good faith believes that the prospect of payment or performance is
impaired. The burden of establishing lack of good faith is on the party against
whom the power has been exercised."
32. For the origin of the rule, see Cooke v. Colehan, 2 Strange 1217, 93 Eng.
Rep. 1140 (1743).
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bility under section 3-109(2), but an effective post-obituary
note, "I promise to pay 100 years from date, but payment shall
be accelerated by the death of my Uncle George to a point of
time six weeks after said death," would be negotiable under sec-
tion 3-109(1) (c).
B. Indorsements
Reference already has been made in this article to the fact
that the UCC solves a bank collection difficulty by exempting
intermediate, collecting banks from restrictions placed on an
instrument by a restrictive indorser. Other less significant
changes also are made by the UCC respecting restrictive in-
dorsements. Under section 3-206 a restrictive indorsee is allowed
to be a holder in due course. That is to say, the UCC recognizes
that one is not necessarily barred from the status of holder in
due course by virtue of the fact that he has taken under a
restrictive indorsement. This reverses the rule which has de-
veloped under the NIL.3 3 Usually, of course, one taking under a
restrictive indorsement will do so as an agent of the restrictive
indorser and thus give no value for the instrument. In this case,
he will not be a holder in due course, not because of his status
of restrictive indorsee, but because the concept of holder in due
course requires the giving of value. Occasionally the restrictive
indorsee will give value, as, for example, where he takes the
paper as a representative for some third party. In this situa-
tion, there is no merit in denying him the status of holder in
due course if he has taken the paper before it was due and with-
out knowledge of defenses. Thus, if A restrictively indorses
paper, "Pay B only on trust for C," B should be able to cut off
prior defenses if he has paid A for the instrument and otherwise
satisfied the requirements of a holder in due course.
Section 3-204 of the UCC makes another important change
respecting indorsements by reversing the common law dogma,
"once bearer always bearer." This dogma expressed the rule
that bearer paper, whether it became such because bearer on its
face, or, if order on its face, by reason of a blank indorsement,
could be negotiated by delivery alone. Because a blank indorse-
ment was said to convert an instrument payable to order on its
face into bearer paper, the dogma meant that even though the
blank indorsement was followed by a special indorsement the
33. See, for example, Gulbranson-Dickinson Co. v. Hopkins, 170 Wis. 326, 175
N.W. 93 (1919).
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instrument remained negotiable by delivery alone.3 4 This rule
limited the ownership rights of the special indorser, because it
did not give him the power to determine future methods of
negotiation. As a practical matter this prevented him from
negotiating the paper in such a manner as to require the in-
dorsement of his indorsee, thus depriving him of a means of
obtaining evidence of the satisfaction of his own obligation.
Moreover, the "once bearer always bearer" dogma was incon-
sistent with other commercial statutes which uniformly pro-
vided that the last indorsement determined future methods of
negotiation. 35 Rectification is made by section 3-204(1) which
provides that, "Any instrument specially indorsed becomes pay-
able to the order of the special indorsee and may be further
negotiated only by his indorsement," and by section 3-204(2)
which states that, "An indorsement in blank specifies no par-
ticular indorsee and may consist of a mere signature. An instru-
ment payable to order and indorsed in blank becomes payable
to bearer and may be negotiated by delivery until specially in-
dorsed."
C. Liability of Parties
The UCC makes several interesting and important changes
concerning the liability of parties to commercial paper. One of
these changes reverses section 15 of the NIL. Under NIL sec-
tion 16, lack of delivery of a completed instrument gives rise
to a personal defense only. Similarly, under NIL section 14, the
unauthorized completion of a partially blank instrument de-
livered to the payee or holder is only a personal defense. But
the two situations taken together - the case of non-delivery of
an incomplete instrument - gives rise to a real defense under
section 15 of the NIL. This rule seems illogical in view of the
fact that its component parts are regarded as creating a per-
sonal defense only, and it tends to throw the risk of loss on
to the remote payer who is not in a good position to police
against it. For this reason, some courts operating under the
34. Smith v. Clarke, Peake 295, 170 Eng. Rep. 162 (1794) ; Mitchell v. Fuller,
15 Pa. 268, 53 Am. Dec. 594 (1850) ; Howry v. Eppinger, 34 Mich. 29 (1876).
35. See, for example, § 29 of the Uniform Bills of Lading Act which provides
that, "A negotiable bill may be negotiated by the endorsement of the person to
whose order the goods are deliverable by the tenor of the bill. Such endorsement
may be in blank or to a specified person. If endorsed to a specified person, it may
be negotiated again by the endorsement of such person in blank or to another
specified person. Subsequent negotiation may be made in like manner." An
almost identical provision is found in section 38of the Uniform Warehouse Receipt
Act.
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NIL largely ignored section 15 by estopping its assertion."
Sections 3-305, 3-306 and 3-115 of the UCC offer a preferable
solution, namely a rule which makes lack of delivery and un-
authorized completion a personal defense only. Official comment
5 to section 3-115 explains the reason behind the change:
"A holder in due course sees and takes the same paper,
whether it was complete when stolen or completed after-
ward by the thief, and in each case he relies in good faith
on the maker's signature. The loss should fall upon the
party whose conduct in signing blank paper has made the
fraud possible, rather than upon the innocent purchaser."
An analogous problem - that of the "fictitious payee" -
similarly has been solved in a straight-forward manner by the
UCC. Under traditional notions of commercial paper, the holder
of an order instrument is not divested of his rights if the paper
is stolen from him and his indorsement is forged to it. Con-
sistently, the maker or drawee cannot discharge himself from
liability by paying the possessor of such an instrument. A dif-
ferent rule, of course, applies to bearer paper. Where paper
apparently drawn to the order of a designated payee has been
issued as part of a fraudulent scheme under which the person
drawing the paper knew that the designated payee was to have
no interest in it, the NIL protected payers by characterizing the
paper as "bearer" in form. In this connection section 9(3) of
the NIL provides that, "The instrument is payable to bearer
when it is payable to the order of a fictitious or non-existing
person and such fact was known to the person making it so pay-
able." But often in "fictitious payee" cases, one party- often
a fraudulent payroll clerk - causes the instrument to be exe-
cuted by another party - such as the treasurer of a company -
who does intend the designated payee to have an interest in it.
If the payroll clerk then forges the payee's name to the instru-
ment, should a bank be able to debit the account of the drawer
upon making payment, or must it regard the paper as "order" in
form and re-credit the account upon notification of the forged
indorsement? This question has generated a king-size split of
authority under the NIL,87 and the technicality of the rules in-
36. The leading case is Weiner v. Pennsylvania Co. for the Insurance on
Lives, etc., 160 Pa. Super. 320, 51 A.2d 385 (1947). But estoppel is not available
in all cases. See, for example, Joseph Heimberg, Inc. v. Lincoln Nat'l Bank, 118
N.J.L. 76, 172 Atl. 528 (1934).
37. For a collection of cases, see BRITTON, BLLS D NoTrs 425-40 (2d ed.
1961).
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volved often have• prevented the courts from coming to grips
with the basic problems of fault and administration of risk
which underlie the matter.
Section 3-405 recognizes that various kinds of fraud prac-
ticed on business concerns involving commercial paper are busi-
ness and not banking risks.38 Thus, commercial paper made pay-
able to fictitious employees (payroll fraud), to nonexistent or
fictitious suppliers (invoice fraud) or to impostors create situa-
tions in which the bank paying the items can debit the account
of the business concern victimized by these schemes. It achieves
this result by making effective the indorsement "by any person
in.the name of a named payee." This solution is regarded as
superior to that of finding the paper to be bearer in form, be-
cause, as official comment 1 to the section indicates, "on the face
of things they are payable to order and a subsequent taker should
require: what purports to be a regular chain of indorsements."
One! important change in the laws governing the liability
of secondary parties is the rule of section 3-501 (3) eliminating
the requirement of protest except upon dishonor of a draft which
on its face appears to be either drawn or payable outside the
United States. A holder, of course, is still permitted to make
protest on any dishonor, but secondary parties are entitled to
it only in the case of the international draft. This rule will aid
bank collections and obviate unnecessary expense.
IV. Tabular Summary Comparing the NIL with article III
of'the UCC89
N.I.L. U.O.C.
Section Section Remarks
1 3-103 Investment securities no longer covered by the law of
negotiable instruments.
38. Section 3-405 provides that, "(1) An indorsement by any person in the
name- of a named payee is -effective if (a) an imposter by use of the mails or
otherwise has induced the. maker or drawer to issue the instrument to him or his
confederate. in the name of the payee; or (b) a person signing as or on behalf
of a maker or drawer intends the payee to have no interest in the instrument; or
(c) an agent or employee of the maker or drawer has supplied him with the
name of the payee intending the latter to have no such interest. (2) Nothing
in this section shall affect the criminal or civil liability of the person so indorsing."
39. Reprinted from HAWKLAND, COMMECIAL PAPER UNDER THE U.C.C. (Joint
Committee on Continuing Legal Education 1959) with the permission of the
Joint Committee.
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N.I.L. U..C.
Section Section
1 3-104
1(5) 3-102
2 3-106
3 3-105
4 3-109
5 3-104
5 3-112
6(1) 3-114(1)
6(4) 3-113
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Remarks
The Code continues, without much change, the basic
formal requisites of negotiability: (a) Writing, signed
by maker or drawer; (b) unconditional promise or
order to pay a sum certain in money; (c) payable on
demand or at a definite time; (d) payable to order or
bearer.
Under the Code, unlike N.I.L., drawees may be joint
or alternative but not successive. The change is not
of commercial importance, because American drafts
are seldom drawn on alternative drawees. Section 128
of N.I.L. partially reversed by this Code rule.
Notes providing for a discount for early payment are
not necessarily non-negotiable under Code. Like
N.l.L., the Code continues to permit some "luggage"
without adversely affecting the "sum certain". But,
like the N.I.L., no provision is made authorizing tax-
concession clauses.
Code makes it clear that, so far as negotiability is con-
cerned, the conditional or unconditional character of
the promise is to be determined by what is expressed
in the instrument itself. Broad statements of the
transaction permitted by Code without destroying
negotiability. "Particular fund" doctrine revised.
Code permits "any acceleration" without destroying
negotiability; "extensions" also broadly validated by
Code. Code attempts to make non-negotiable post-
Obit. notes, but negotiability here can be saved by use
of acceleration.
The Code omits N.I.L. 5(4) which permits "com-
modity notes" to be negotiable. Under Code only
instruments payable in money can be negotiable. But
Code talks only of "negotiability within this article"
and this leaves open the possibility that some writings
may be made negotiable by other statutes or by
judicial decision. Where, therefore, it is important
that "commodity notes" be negotiable, local statutes
may make them so without any need to amend or
manipulate the U.C.C.
The Code permits negotiable instruments to include
clauses authorizing the sale of collateral for instru-
ment upon "any default", including a default in the
payment of an installment or interest. It is not limit-
ed, as is section 5(1) of the N.I.L., to default at ma-
turity. Also clauses are permitted by Code which are
designed to protect collateral or to give additional col-
lateral. However, negotiability is affected by "confes-
sion of judgment" clauses unless they are limited to
situations in which the instrument is not paid when
due.
No change.
Seals do not affect negotiability.
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NJ.L. U.C.O.
Section Section
6(5) 3-107
7 3-108
3-502
8 3-110
9 3-111
9(3) 3-405
9(5) 3-204
10 -
11 3-114
12
13 3-115
14
15
16 3-305
3-306
17 3-118
Remarks
"Money" elaborately defined by U.C.C. "Foreign"
money all right for purposes of negotiability. Money
tested by government sanction under U.C.C.
U.C.C. rewords N.I.L. and the last sentence of N.I.L.
section 7 is omitted. This section defined as "de-
mand" paper any paper issued, accepted, indorsed,
etc., after it was due. Code takes care of special prob-
lems by appropriate provisions relating to holder in
due course, presentment, notice of dishonor and so on.
Under the Code, instruments payable to the order of
an estate of a decedent is order paper, not bearer
paper as it is under N.I.L. Under the Code a nego-
tiable instrument may be made payable to an estate,
partnership, trust, etc. Such paper is order paper.
Like the N.I.L., the Code provides that instruments
payable to "cash" or any other indication which does
not purport to designate a specific payee, are bearer
instruments.
The "fictitious payee" problem is solved in a straight-
forward way, and order paper is not converted into
bearer paper to accomplish the result, as it is under
the N.I.L.
The last indorsement controls future method of nego-
tiation under the Code, even though the paper is pay-
able to bearer on its face.
Section 10 of N.I.L., omitted by Code, but official
note 5 to section 3-104 makes it clear that the Code
does not require that particular words appear in nego-
tiable instruments.
Under Code, negotiability is not affected by fact that
instrument is undated, antedated or postdated, even if
this is done for an illegal purpose. This changes
N.I.L. sec. 12. The date stated on the instrument con-
trols payment where it is payable on demand or at a
fixed period after sight. This clarifies sec. 11 of
N.I.L.
The Code omits N.I.L. sec. 13 and part of sec. 14
and reverses the rule of sec. 15. Under the Code an
undated instrument is treated as an incomplete instru-
ment. Incomplete instruments, not completed pursu-
ant to authority, give obligors a personal defense, even
when such instruments have not been delivered.
No change.
The Code's rules with respect to ambiguous terms and
methods of construction follow the case law which
has developed under N.I.L. The rules, set out in
section 17 of N.I.L., are completely re-written. One
change is made: 3-118(f) provides that the maker
must consent to every time extension. Unless other-
wise agreed, an agreement to extend time authorizes a
single extension for not longer than the original period.
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Section Section
18 3-401
19 3-403
20 3-403
21 -
22 3-207
28 8-404
24 3-408
25 3-303
26
27
28 3-303
3-305
3-306
3-408
29 3-415
30 3-202
31 3-202
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No change.
No change.
Code clarifies N.I.L. rules regarding signatures made
in a representative capacity. The liability of the un-
authorized representative is handled by a separate sec-
tion under the Code (3404).
Section 21 is omitted by the Code. Signatures "by
procuration" are no longer fashionable and do not
deserve special statutory treatment. Signature by
procuration is still possible under Code and should
have the effect stated in N.I.L. 21. See comment 4
to see. 3-403.
Under the Code, negotiation is effective to transfer
the instrument even if it is obtained by fraud, made
in breach of duty, or is part of an illegal transaction.
This extends N.I.L. 22. The Code permits the de-
frauded party, the infant, etc., to rescind the transfer,
but until he does so he leaves the transferee in a posi-
tion of power, the exercise of which by negotiation to
a holder in due course will result in cutting off the
right to rescind.
Under the Code the unauthorized agent is liable to a
holder in due course. The forger is also liable on
the instrument.
No change.
Under the Code an executory promise to give value
is not value. This changes some cases under the
N.I.L. A holder who does not himself give value
cannot be a holder in due course. This reverses some
holdings under section 26 of N.I.L. A lien acquired
by legal process is not value under the Code. This
modifies section 27 of N.I.L.
The Code continues the rule of sec. 28 of N.I.L.
Under the Code, an accommodation party is always a
surety. He differs from other sureties only in that his
liability [is] on the instrument. His suretyship de-
fenses are personal and are cut off by a holder in due
course. His suretyship rights remain even after an
instrument is "paid".
No change, except 3-202(4) rejects decisions handed
down under N.I.L. that words of assignment, condi-
tion, waiver, etc., accompanying an "indorsement"
show an intention not to indorse. Also payee can be
holder in due course under Code.
No change.
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NJ.L. U.0.0.
Section Section
32 3-202(3)
33 3-204
34
35
36 3-205
37 3-206
38 3-414
39 3-205
3-206
40 3-204
41 3-116
42 3-117
43 3-203
44 3-414
Remarks
The Code makes it clear that the cause of action on
an instrument cannot be split. Negotiation takes place
only when the entire instrument or unpaid residue is
conveyed. But a conveyance of a lesser interest is
effective as a partial assignment.
Code's definition of "special" and "blank" indorse-
ments follows N.I.L. But effect of special indorse-
ment on bearer paper is different. See notes to N.I.L.
40 in this appendix.
Code section 3-205 provides a clear definition of re-
strictive indorsements. This definition includes what
was termed a "conditional indorsement" under N.I.L.
sec. 39. Code section 3-206 gives restrictive indorse-
ments a different effect from that accorded them by
the N.I.L. Under the Code, a restrictive indorsee
can be a holder in due course; intermediary banks
may disregard the restrictive indorsement except that
of its immediate transferor; and a restrictive indorse-
ment does not prevent further negotiation.
The Code does not use the words "qualified indorse-
ment", but makes it clear that the indorsement con-
tract can be disclaimed by words such as "without re-
course".
Conditional indorsements, under the Code, are treated
as restrictive indorsements. This results in no change,
since a restrictive indorsee under the Code can be a
holder in due course, further negotiation is not pre-
vented, and the payor is not affected by the restrictive
indorsement.
The Code reverses the "once bearer always bearer"
dogma of section 40 of the N.I.L. A special indorse-
ment of paper which is bearer on its face makes the
paper payable to the order of the special indorsee and
it may be further negotiated only by his indorsement.
No change, but the law is clarified by a hard-and-
fast distinction between paper payable to "A or B"
and paper payable to "A and B". Either A or B
alone may negotiate the first instrument; both must
indorse in order to negotiate the second.
The Code extends the N.I.L. rule so as to cover agents
or fiduciaries, identified as such, as payees.
No change.
The Code omits section 44 as unnecessary. The right
of the agent to negative personal liability when he in-
dorses in his representative capacity is included in
the broad right under the Code to disclaim any lia-
bility.
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N.I.L. U.C.O.
Oection Section
45 3-304
47 3-206
48 3-208
49 3-201
50 3-208
51 3-301
3-603
52 3-302
3-304
53 3-304
54 3-303
55 3-304
56
Remarks
The Code omits section 45 of the N.I.L. Under the
Code, the presumption that any negotiation has taken
place before the instrument was overdue is of impor-
tance only in aid of a holder in due course. Under
3-304 any holder who takes paper without notice that
it is overdue can be a holder in due course, whether
or not the paper is overdue. This rule makes N.I.L.
sec. 45 unnecessary.
The rule of section 47 of the N.I.L. that a restrictive
indorsement "kills" negotiability is reversed by the
Code. See remarks under N.I.L. 36 and 37 in this
appendix.
No change.
The Code applies to any transfer, whether by a holder
or not. Thus the "umbrella" protection of sections 58
and 49 of the N.I.L. are combined by 3-201. The
Code indicates that the transferee for value is entitled
to an "unqualified" indorsement. This follows the
cases under the N.I.L., but it is contrary to scholarly
opinion which holds that, since mere transfer or as-
signment is closer to the qualified indorsement in ef-
fect, the mere transferee should only be able to compel
a qualified indorsement.
No change.
The holder has a basic right to discharge the instru-
ment, and this right is limited only by injunction or
by a third-party claim accompanied by an adequate
indemnity. The basic right is set out in section 3-301,
and the limitations on it are found in 3-603.
Under Code, a holder in due course is one who takes
in good faith, for value, and without notice that the
instrument is overdue or of any defense against or
claim to it on the part of any person. There is no
requirement that the paper be "complete and regular",
but this requirement is assimilated by the good faith
requirement. Good faith is mainly subjective ("white
heart"), but some suspicious circumstances outlined
by 3-304 prevent good faith taking. Payees are eligi-
ble to become holders in due course.
No "hange, except that a domestic check is presumed
overdue after 30 days.
Code changes rule of N.I.L. that executory promise
can be value. Under Code, an executory promise to
give value is not itself value except in special cases
set out in 3-303(c).
The Code is much more explicit with regard to the
kind of facts which prevent due course holding.
250
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N.I.L. U.C.C.
Section Section
57 3-305
58 3-201
3-306
59 3-207
3-306
3-307
60 3-413(1)
61 3-413
62 3413
3-417
3418
63 3-402
64 3415
65 3-417
66
67 3414
Remarks
The Code enumerates the real defenses. Failure to
deliver an incomplete instrument is only a personal
defense under the Code, thus reversing section 15 of
the N.I.L. See remarks under see. 15 in this ap-
pendix. 3-305(2) (e) makes it clear that a holder
knowing of certain discharges can nevertheless be a
holder in due course with respect to undischarged
parties.
Under the Code, a successor to a holder in due course
is treated as if he were a holder in due course in his
own right. This umbrella protection involves little
change from the N.I.L. See section 49 of N.I.L. in
this appendix.
Code 3-307 continues the N.I.L. rule on burden of
proof with regard to due course holding. 3-306 denies
the defense of jus tertii except where the decision will
be res adjudicata to all parties.
No change.
Section 3-413 sets out the 'basic contract of the
drawer, qua drawer. The section does not change
the rule of sec. 61 of the N.I.L.
Under the Code, the acceptor of either a check or a
draft engages that he will pay the instrument accord-
ing to its tenor at the time of his engagement, not
(in case of alteration before acceptance) to its orig-
inal tenor. This solves a division of authority under
the N.I.L. While a drawee can charge his drawer
only to the extent of the instrument's original tenor,
he can charge back any loss occasioned by accepting
an instrument raised to a larger amount, for 3-417
provides that the one obtaining an acceptance war-
rants to the acceptor that the instrument has not
been materially altered.
No change.
Under the Code, the accommodation party is always
a surety, but is liable in the capacity in which he
signs. As surety, he is not liable to the principal
debtor. These rules make N.I.L. sec. 64 unnecessary.
The Code makes a number of changes, mostly for
purposes of clarification, in the warranty law of the
N.I.L. Price v. Neal is retained by the Code, but is
stated as a rule of warranty and not as a rule of
quasi-contract. Warranties run against persons who
obtain payment or acceptance, or who transfer the
instrument for value. Warranties run in favor of
payors and acceptors and holders who take the in-
strument in good faith. Code rule makes the mere
transferor more liable than the qualified indorser.
Warranties may be disclaimed. Damages for breach
of warranty not specified by Code.
No change.
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N.I.L. U.O.C.
Section Section
68 3-119
3-414
69 3-417(4)
70 3-501
3-502
3-604(3)
71 8-503
72 3-503
73 3-504
74 3-505
75 3-503
76 3-511(3)
77 3-504 (3) (a)
78 3-504(3) (a)
79 3-511
80
81
82
Remarks
No change. But 3-11.9 makes it clear that indorsers,
among themselves, can regulate order of liability by
an instrument external to the negotiable instrument.
Holders in due course are not bound by this agree-
ment.
No change.
An unexcused delay in presentment discharges "any
drawer or the acceptor of a draft payable at a bank or
the maker of a note payable at a bank who because
the drawee or payor bank becomes insolvent during the
delay is deprived of funds maintained with the drawee
or payor bank to cover the instrument may discharge
his liability by written assignment to the holder of his
rights against the drawee or payor bank in respect of
such funds, but such drawer, acceptor or maker is not
otherwise discharged." This rule greatly extends
N.I.L. 186 which applies only to drawers of checks.
Indorsers are completely discharged by slow present-
ment.
Code continues rule that demand instruments be pre-
sented in reasonable time. But reasonable time is
measured, under Code, from date that party became
liable on the instrument, and presumption set out that
reasonable time to present or initiate collection of an
uncertified check is 30 days to hold drawer and 7
days to hold indorsers. The weird rule of N.I.L. 71
that presentment of demand drafts and checks is rea-
sonable time after last negotiation is reversed.
Under Code, presentment may be made by mail or
through a clearing house. Presentment is made by a
demand on the party to pay, and it is sufficient no
matter where or how made. The N.I.L. requirements
of exhibition and the like are not required unless
insisted upon by 'the party to pay. 3-505 gives the
party to pay the right to exhibition, identification of
presenting party, compliance with place requirements,
and a receipt. The presenting party has a reasonable
time to comply with these requests.
Presentment to bank, under Code, must be consistent
with banking practices. Bank holidays recognized.
Presentment is excused, in most cases under the Code,
where the maker, acceptor or drawee is dead or in-
solvent. This reverses N.I.L. 76.
No change.
Under the Cide, presentment may be made to any one
of two or more makers, acceptors, drawees or other
payors. This reverses N.I.L. 78.
No change. Code 3-511 collects in one place all rules
on dispensation of presentment, notice of dishonor and
protest.
SOME OBSERVATIONS
N.I.L. U.C.U.
Section Section
83 3,503 (3)
3-507(4)
84 3-507(2)
85 3-503
86 3-503
87 3-121
88 3-603
89 3-501
3-502
90- 3-508
108
109- 3-511
116
Remarks
Under the Code, return of an instrument for lack of
proper indorsement is not a dishonor. And, a term
permitting "re-presentment" in case of dishonor, gives
the holder, as against any secondary party bound by
the term, an option to waive the dishonor without dis-
charging the secondary party. These Code provisions
are new, but they express general banking and com-
mercial understanding.
No change.
Under Code, presentment is due on the next full busi-
ness day for both parties when it originally falls due
on a day which is not a full business day for all
parties. This recognizes the increasing practice of
closing banks and businesses on Saturday and other
"holidays".
The Code omits N.I.L. sec. 86 as superfluous. Sec. 86
states a rule applied to all time calculations where
commercial instruments are involved. No change in
the law is intended. See note 1 to sec. 3-503.
The Code gives enacting states a choice of two alter-
natives, one of which is identical with N.I.L. sec. 87
as construed in the north and east. The other repre-
sents present southern and western thinking.
Payment, under the Code, discharges the liability of
the payor, even though he knows that a third party
has a claim to the instrument, unless the third party
enjoins payment or supplies an adequate indemnity.
This reverses the usual meaning given to "payment in
due course" under N.I.L. 88.
Unexcused delay of notice of dishonor, under Code,
has same effect as unexcused delay in presentment.
See remarks in this appendix to sec. 70 of N.I.L.
Section 3-508 collects in one place the rules on notice
of dishonor. The Code simplifies the law by omitting
many of the detailed requirements of the N.I.L. Some
changes are made. Notice of dishonor may be given
by merely "sending the instrument bearing a stamp,
ticket or writing stating that acceptance or payment
has been refused or sending a notice of debit with
respect to the instrument." Any person other than a
bank has three days in which to give notice of dis-
honor; banks have until midnight of next banking
day. This time leeway takes pressure off need for de-
tailed time rules. Under the Code, any party who can
be compelled to pay the instrument may give notice.
Code 3-51.1 combines and simplifies widely scattered
rules in N.1.L. Single terms "excused" and "entirely
excused" are substituted for "excused", "dispensed
with", "not necessary", "not required" and "waived",
as used variously in N.I.L. No change in substantive
law, however.
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N.I.L. U.C.C.
Section Section
118 3-501(3)
119 3-601 to
120 3-606
121 3-208
3-601
3-603
122 3-605
3-602
123 3-605
124 3-407
125
126 3-104
127 3-409
128 3-102(1) (b)
129 3-501(3)
130 3-511
Remarks
Protest is required under the Code only in the case
of the international draft.
The N.I.L. scheme of "payment in due course", "prin-
cipal debtor", "discharge of the instrument", "dis-
charge of secondary parties", etc., is abandoned by the
Code and replaced by a system stating facts which will
discharge one or more parties. Discharge amounts to
a personal defense only under the Code. Methods of
discharge are enumerated and indexed in section 3-601
of Code. These methods involve little change from
N.I.L. Suretyship "discharges" available to primary
parties.
The words of N.I.L. 121 "remitted to his former
rights" arp omitted by the Code, making it clear that
an irregular indorser under the Code can recover on
the instrument if he pays it. Under the Code, anyone
who pays an instrument succeeds to the rights of the
holder, subject to the limitation that one who has
himself been a party to any fraud or illegality affect-
ing the instrument or who as a prior holder had
notice of a defense or claim against it cannot improve
his position by taking from a later holder in due
course.
The N.I.L. does not state how cancellation is to be
made other than striking indorsements. Code makes
it clear that the cancellation must be done in a man-
ner apparent on the face of the instrument. Effect of
cancellation, like that of other forms of discharge, is
to give a personal defense only.
Code omits sec. 123 of N.I.L., but no change in the
law is intended.
Code re-writes sections 124 and 125 without greatly
changing law. Under Code, an alteration is "ma-
terial" if it changes the contract of any party in any
respect. But a material alteration does not discharge
any party unless it is made for a fraudulent purpose
by a holder. If the alteration is not material or if it is
not made for a fraudulent purpose, the instrument
may be enforced according to its original tenor. I n
any case, a holder in due course takes free of the
discharge and may enforce the instrument according
to original tenor.
"Bill of exchange" is called "draft" under Code. No
change in substantive law.
No change.
Under Code, drawees in the alternative are allowed.
This reverses N.I.L. 128.
N.I.L. terminology of "inland" and "foreign" bills is
abandoned by Code. Protest is required by Code only
in case of international drafts.
No change.
SOME OBSER VA TIONS
Section Section
N.I.L. U.C.C7.
131 4-503
132 3-410
137 3-506
3-419
3-409
138 3-410
139- 3-412
142
143 3-501
144 3-501
3-502
3-503
145 3-504
146 3-503
147 3-511
148
149 3-507
150 8-501
151 84502
8-511
Remarks
Code 4-503 lists the responsibilities of the presenting
bank. One of these is that it "may seek and follow
instructions from any referee in case of need desig-
nated in the draft". This seems in accord with
N.1.L. 131.
Code section 3-410 collects in one place the N.I.L.
rules of acceptance. Under the Code acceptance must
be written on the draft. This eliminates the extrinsic
acceptances permitted by N.I.L. sections 134 and 135.
Constructive acceptance under section 137 of N.I.L.
is also impossible under Code, but action for con-
version of breach of contract to accept will give re-
lief to parties aggrieved. The conversion rule is set
out in section 3-419 of Code. The contract rule ap-
pears in section 3-409(2). Acceptance may be de-
ferred without dishonor until the close of the next
business day following presentment. See Code 3-506
(). Failure to accept within this time limit is a
dishonor and not a constructive acceptance.
Under the Code, where the draft is payable at a fixed
period after sight and the acceptor fails to date his
acceptance the holder may complete it by supplying
a date in good faith. This changes to some extent
N.I.L. 138.
Code sections 3-412 collects in one place all rules on
acceptances which vary drafts. The code abandons
the terms "qualified acceptance" in favor of "accept-
ance varying draft." Consequences of holder assenting
to acceptance varying draft are same as N.I.L.:
drawer and indorsers are discharged. Holder may
reject drawee's proffered varying acceptance and treat
draft as dishonored. Same rule under N.I.L.
No change.
See discussion under N.I.L. secs. 70 and 71 of this
appendix.
Presentment may be made by mail or through clearing
house. It may be made to any one of two makers,
acceptors, drawees.
See discussion in this appendix under N.I.L. see. 85.
See discussion of this code provision under N.I.L.
sections 109-116.
Return of instrument for lack of indorsement is not
a dishonor. See discussion this appendix under N.I.L.
sec. 83.
No change in substance.
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N.I.L. U..C.
Section Section
152- 3-509
'156 3-510
157- 3-50i
159 3-509
3-511
160 3-509
3-804
161- None
170
171- 3-603
177
178- 3-801
183
184 3-104
185 3-104
186 3-501
3-M2
3-503
187- 3-411
188
Remarks
Code section 3-509 collects most of the protest rules,
and makes some changes in law of N.I.L. Only in-
ternational drafts must be protested under Code. The
protest must indentify the instrument, and recite the
fact of presentment or reason why presentment is
excused. It may also certify that notice of dishonor
has been given. Protest may be certified only by
United States consul or vice consul or a notary public
or other person authorized to certify dishonor by the
law of the place where dishonor occurs. This changes
N.I.L. 1.54(2) which permits protest to be made "by
any respectable resident of the place where the bill is
dishonored." Under Code, protest need not be made
at place of dishonor, but may be made upon informa-
tion. This reverses N.I.L. 156. Sec. 3-510 states
that protest is admissible into evidence and creates a
presumption of dishonor and notice of dishonor therein
shown. The section also provides two substitutes for
protests which have the same evidentiary effect as
protest: a stamp on the instrument showing it was
dishonored; and the books or records of the dishonor-
ing drawee, collecting bank, etc., even though there is
no evidence who made the entry.
No basic changes.
If instrument is lost under Code, protest is still
sufficient if it identifies the instrument. But the
owner must prove his rights under section 3-804 which
deals with lost, stolen or destroyed instruments.
The practice of acceptance for honor has been obsolete
for many years in America, and the Code therefore
omits completely all rules relating to this ancient
practice.
Payment for honor covered by sections 171-177 of
N.I.L. is now handled by 3-603 of the Code. The
Code permits "payment or satisfaction (to) be made
with the consent of the holder by any person including
a stranger to the instrement." Surrender of the in-
strument to such a person gives him the rights of a
transferee.
No change in substance.
No change except certificate of deposit is separately
defined.
No basic change.
See discussion in this appendix under N.I.L. sec. 70.
No change.
'SOME OBSERVATIONS
N.I.L. U...
Section Section
189 3-409
190 3-101
191
192 None
193 3-503(2)
194 None
195
196 1-103
197 None
198 10-101
U.C.6.
3-406
3-416
3-510
3-701
Remarks
No change
Code article called "Uniform Commercial Code-Com-
mercial Paper."
There are many definitions appearing throughout the
Code. They cannot be summarized here.
The Code has no provision like sec. 192 of N.I.L.,
but the terms 'primary" and "secondary" are still
useful in analyzing the Code.
Code uses "reasonable time" concept, but measures
it from a different point and is more specific with
respect to drawer and indorsers of uncertified checks.
Code continues the Law Merchant as a "gap filler."
Effective date necessarily up to enacting state.
NEW PROVISIONS IN THE CODE.
Remarks
While this section is statutorily new, it simply de-
clares the common law respecting the estoppel effect
of negligence which contributes to an alteration or
forgery of a negotiable instrument.
A new statutory definition of the contract of the
guarantor. The section declares the common commer-
cial underwriting as to the meaning and effect of
words of guaranty added to a signature. One who
by indorsement guarantees payment waives the con-
ditions precedent that usually attach to the indorse-
ment contract and becomes for all practical purposes
a co-maker. A guarantor of collectibility also waives
formal presentment, notice of dishonor and protest,
but the holder must first proceed against the primary
party or show that such a proceeding would be use-
less, before turning to the guarantor.
New law on the matter of protest. See appendix 1,
sec. 3-510.
New provision to put America law in line with
European with respect to the letter of advice of inter-
national drafts. In Europe, a bank paying a check
in good faith can charge the drawer's account not-
withstanding a forgery of a necessary indorsement.
The letter of advice is designed to reduce the chance
of successful forgery. It is written by the drawer to
the drawee notifying the latter that a certain draft
or check has been drawn, etc. The Code adopts the
practice and its legal consequences.
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RemarksU.C.6,.
3-802 This new section settles some conflicts of authority
with respect to the effect of an instrument on the
underlying obligation for which it is given. Normally,
under the section. where an instrument is taken for
an underlying obligation, the obligation is suspended
until the instrument is due. Thereafter an action
may be maintained on either the instrument or the
obligation. If the instrument is discharged, the obli-
gation, too is discharged.
This section supplements existing rules of civil pro-
cedure dealing with interpleader, joinder of parties,
and vouching in of interested third parties. It makes
just the rule of 3-603(1) that the defense of jus tertii
is available only where a decision would be res adjudi-
cata to all three interested parties.
New law on methods of recovery on instruments which
are lost, destroyed or stolen. The plaintiff is not a
holder of such an instrument, because he is not in
possession. le must prove his case by establishing
the terms of the instrument, his ownership of it, and
account for its absence.
This section declares the law merchant rules as to
instruments not payable to order or bearer but other-
wise negotiable. Such instruments are not negotiable
under the Code, but are treated as negotiable so far
as their form permits. There can be no holder in due
course of such an instrument, but, with this exception,
most of the other sections of the Code apply to such
instruments.
3-803
3-804
3-805
